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Abstract: The paper proposes a combined account of identity for physical states and
direct empirical significance for symmetries according to which symmetry-related
state variables designate distinct physical states if and only if the symmetry that
relates them has direct empirical significance. Strengthening an earlier result, I
show that, given this combined account, the local gauge symmetries in our leading
contemporary theories of particle physics do not have any direct empirical signifi-
cance.
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1 Introduction: Identifying physical states
Understanding a physical theory involves understanding the ways the world can be
if the theory is true. One important aspect of the latter is having criteria of identity
for its physical states.
Individuating a theory’s distinct physical states comprises, first, the broad sub-
task of clarifying in which way competent scientists use the formalism of the theory
and employ it to predict and/or explain certain empirical phenomena. Second, it
comprises the subtask of specifying those variables of the formalism that have the
semantic and/or linguistic role of actually designating the world’s physically pos-
sible distinct states. One may refer to these variables as the ontic variables of the
theory, and for some theories identifying them can be a real challenge. In quan-
tum theory, for example, it is notoriously controversial whether quantum states
are (among the) ontic variables of the theory or whether they are rather—in some
sense to be clarified—“epistemic”, i.e. more akin to classical probability distribu-
tions over whatever one regards as the true physical states that underlie quantum
theory.1
In this paper, I assume that, for some theory of interest, these first two subtasks
have already been solved. This may still leave open a third subtask that will stand
in the focus of this paper: namely, to clarify how ontic variables are mapped onto the
physical states, i.e. whether distinct ontic variables sometimes designate one and
1See (Leifer 2014) for a highly useful review of, on the one hand, the motives to doubt
that quantum states are ontic and, on the other hand, the difficulties that arise from
assuming that they are not ontic.
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the same physical state or, put more generally, how one can individuate a theory’s
physical states by starting from the ontic variables. To be able to sidestep the
question of whether quantum states are ontic or epistemic, I will focus on classical
theories.
2 Physical states and symmetries
A physical theory’s symmetry transformations (“symmetries”) connect ontic vari-
ables that designate empirically indistinguishable physical states. A possible reason
of why states that are designated by distinct ontic variables can be empirically in-
distinguishable is that they are not physically distinct at all, i.e. distinct ontic
variables which apply to a system in empirically indistinguishable situations may
designate identical physical states. Accordingly, a promising approach to identi-
fying a theory’s distinct physical states is by focusing on its symmetries, notably
by identifying and classifying them. Fortunately, there exists a well-established
strategy to determine the symmetries of a physical theory, namely, by determing
those transformations of the variable space of the theory with respect to which the
Lagrangian of the theory is invariant.2 See the appendix for a brief review of the
symmetries of classical Yang-Mills gauge theories—the type of theory whose quan-
tum version is the paradigm of a modern particle physics theory—as particularly
relevant and illuminating examples.
If there are well-established procedures to determine a theory’s symmetries, how
can there still be a non-trivial challenge of clarifying which ontic variables designate
identical physical states? As far as states of the entire universe (conceived of as a,
or the, spatio-temporally maximal system) are concerned, there may indeed not be
such a challenge: as forcefully argued by Baker (2011), there are good reasons to
regard any pair of symmetry-related ontic variables that apply to the entire universe
as designating one and the same physical state. For example, if one assumes that the
laws of nature are rotation-invariant and considers the state of the entire universe
rotated with respect to some fixed axis by some constant angle, it makes sense
to regard the rotated state merely as a notational variant of the non-rotated state
rather than as physically different. The assumption that symmetry-related universe
states are physically identical is article.
However, with respect to subsystems of the universe—by which for the purposes
of this paper I mean compact, finite proper subregions of the universe—it is not
so clear whether one should really regard any two symmetry-related subsystem
states as physically identical. To begin with, it is not entirely straightforward to
define subsystem symmetries in the first place. The obvious definition is in terms
of restrictions of universe symmetries to subsystems, but it is not immediately clear
how to do this since universe symmetries may not leave the subsystems themselves
2The practical importance of this criterion notwithstanding the challenge of connecting
empirical equivalence with any formal criterion for symmetries such as invariance of the
Lagrangian under variable transformations is actually very complex. See (Belot 2011) for
a study of “symmetry” and “physical equivalence” which explores and highlights some of
the difficulties that arise from this challenge.
Note that in practice the heuristic challenge is typically opposite to the one depicted
in the main text: rather than trying to determine the symmetries of an independently
formulated theory from its Lagrangian, symmetries are imposed and one tries to construct
a Lagrangian that exhibits them together with various other desiderata.
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invariant in the first place. For example, rotations of the Earth around its polar
axis do not in general map continents onto themselves, even though continents
appear to be obvious candidate subsystems of Earth’s surface. The problem does
not arise, however, for so-called internal symmetries, which leave space-time regions
unaffected. Further technical challenges are raised by the fact that subsystems are in
generally not physically isolated from their environment. This has the consequence
that, by restricting a symmetry transformation to a subsystem of the universe,
the resulting post-symmetry subsystem state may no longer give rise to a well-
defined universe state when combined with the original environment state due to
discontinuities on the subsystem boundary.3
Let us assume that we have managed to overcome these technical problems
(e.g. by confining attention to symmetries that map subsystems onto themselves
and considering appropriately isolated subsystems) and arrived at a conception of
subsystem symmetries according to which indeed any symmetry-related subsystem
ontic variables are empirically indistinguishable for observers inside the subsys-
tem. One reason why one may still not want to regard all symmetry-related sub-
system ontic variables as designating physically identical subsystem states is that
symmetry-related subsystem ontic variables may well designate physical states that
differ from the point of view of observers who are external to the subsystem. The
present article explores the idea that two subsystem ontic variables designate one
and the same physical subsystem state only if the states designated by them are
empirically indistinguishable both from within the subsystem and from the point
of view of arbitrary external observers. As it turns out, this idea can be connected
in an illuminating way to a distinction among symmetries that philosophers have
intensely discussed in the past few years, namely, that between symmetries which
have direct empirical significance and symmetries which do not. In what follows I
sketch the rationale that underlies this distinction.
As the philosophical debate about symmetries in physics has clarified4, sym-
metries can be empirically significant in various ways. Notably, their empirical
significance is said to be direct if they relate subsystem states that, though empir-
ically indistinguishable from the point of view of observers restricted to the sub-
system, are empirically distinguishable from the perspective of external observers.
Symmetries that do not have any direct empirical significance, in contrast, relate
states that are empirically equivalent for all observers, whatever their position, and
one may regard them as mere descriptive redundancies in that sense. Inasmuch as
symmetries may empirically manifest themselves in other ways, e.g. by imposing
constraints on the physical laws that connect empirical quantities, they are said to
have indirect empirical significance. The most famous examples of such constraints
are the conservation laws that follow from the Noether theorems.
Direct empirical significance is often illustrated in terms of Galileo’s ship, a
thought experiment that goes back to Galileo’s Dialogue (Galileo 1953): as Salvatius
highlights, there is no empirically detectable difference between what occurs in the
cabin of a ship that is moving uniformly and what occurs in the cabin of a ship
3See (Greaves and Wallace 2014) for detailed reflections on this difficulty.
4See the anthology (Brading and Castellani 2003) for an overview of topics and relevant
articles and (Brown and Sypel 1995, Kosso 2000, Brading and Brown 2004, Healey 2009,
Greaves and Wallace 2014, Friederich 2015, Teh 2015) for contributions that are particu-
larly relevant to the question of direct empirical significance. (Teh 2015, p. 99) provides a
state-of-the-art side-by-side characterization of direct and indirect empirical significance.
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that is at rest with respect to the shore. The example can be used to highlight
that due to the Galilean symmetries of the laws of motion, a boost of the ship to a
constant velocity with respect to the shore is without any empirical consequences
for observations confined to the cabin (which, absent stormy waters, is assumed to
qualify as a sufficiently isolated subsystem). However, since boosting the ship to a
constant velocity with respect to the shore creates an overall empirical difference
with respect to external observers, e.g. observers watching from the shore, the
boost transformation has direct empirical significance and is in that sense not a
mere descriptive redundancy.
3 Symmetries and physical identity
Above we considered the idea of individuating subsystem physical states in terms
of subsystem symmetries: to regard ontic variables s and s′ as designating one
and the same physical subsystem state if they are symmetry-related, which, as
we suppose, entails that they cannot be empirically distinguished from within the
subsystem. The notion of direct empirical significance for symmetries suggests
another, more fine-grained, way of individuating subsystem physical states: ontic
variables s and s′ designate one and the same physical subsystem state if they
are connected by a symmetry without any direct empirical significance. In other
words, s and s′ designate the same physical state if they are empirically equivalent
both from within the subsystem and from the perspectives of arbitrary external
observers. In (Friederich 2015), I used this idea to spell out what it means for
a subsystem symmetry to have direct empirical significance in terms of physical
identity for subsystem states. Using the symbol “∼” to denote the relation of
designating the same physical state between subsystem ontic variables, the criterion
in question “DES” (which stands for “direct empirical significance”) reads:
Assumption (DES)
A subsystem symmetry σ|S has direct empirical significance if and only if σ|S(s) 6∼ s
for some s ∈ S,
where S is the state space associated with the subsystem S. In other words, ac-
cording to DES, σ|S does not have any direct empirical significance if and only if
σ|S(s) ∼ s for all s ∈ S.
Endorsing DES is not the only viable approach to make sense of the idea of di-
rect empirical significance for subsystem symmetries. Another is to define physical
identity only for universe states and to appeal to the constrained Hamiltonian for-
malism. (See (Earman 2003) for an eminent philosopher’s enthusiastic endorsement
of this formalism.) Symmetry transformations which, in this formalism’s language,
are generated by the so-called first-class constraints act trivially on observable
quantities, so it makes sense to regard them as descriptive redundancies and iden-
tify them with the symmetries without direct empirical significance. Nicholas Teh
(2015) has recently argued that according to this criterion there exist interesting
analogies to the Galileo ship scenario in the gauge theories that underlie modern
elementary particle physics. He takes his analysis to partly vindicates an earlier
claim by Greaves and Wallace according to which some of the “local” gauge sym-
metries in gauge theories have direct empirical significance (Greaves and Wallace
2014), contrary to the claims made by other philosophers (Kosso 2000, Redhead
2002, Brading and Brown 2004, Lyre 2004, Healey 2009). Greaves and Wallace
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argue that the local gauge symmetries with direct empirical significance are those
that do not reduce to the identity transformation on the subsystem boundary. Teh,
however, shows that consistent application of the criterion that the symmetries
without direct empirical significance are those that are generated by the first class
constraints in the constrained Hamiltonian formalism yields a different result for
some gauge theories, notably those in which some symmetry transformations con-
nect topologically distinct field configurations (Teh 2015, sec. 4.2).5
As I shall argue in what follows, if—contrary to the approaches just mentioned
that focus on the constrained Hamiltonian formalism—one accepts DES as consti-
tutive of the connection between symmetries and the identity of physical states and
adds two independently plausible assumptions concerning the identity of subsystem
physical states, one comes to a conclusion about which symmetries have direct em-
pirical significance that differs from those defended by Greaves and Wallace (2014)
and Teh (2015). Namely, as I will show, one obtains a result according to which all
(subsystem-restricted) gauge transformations in local gauge theories are without
any direct empirical significance, whether or not they reduce to the identity trans-
formation on the subsystem boundary and whether or not they connect topologi-
cally inequivalent configurations. Essentially the same result was already obtained
in an earlier article (Friederich 2015), but the present article adds to the earlier
considerations by showing that one of the assumptions used there—the assumption
“Ext”—is not needed for the derivation of the result and by further motivating the
other assumptions used there and here.
4 Two assumptions
The two announced assumptions concerning the identity of subsystem physical
states can be formulated using a framework introduced by Greaves and Wallace
(2014). The framework decomposes the universe U into a subsystem S and its
mereological complement, the environment E, and it postulates associated state
spaces U , S, and E for these systems. Elements u ∈ U are taken to be uniquely
decomposable in terms of subsystem states s ∈ S and environment states e ∈ E .
The operation of combining a subsystem with an environment state is denoted by
“∗” (that is, u = s ∗ e is the universe state which arises from combining s and e).
Arbitrary pairs of subsystem and environment states s and e need not in general
give rise to a well-defined universe state u = s ∗ e. For example, if s and e denote
field configurations of a finite space-time region and its environment in a classical
field theory, they do not in general coincide on the subsystem boundary, and in
case they do, their derivatives may not coincide. In these cases, their composition
need not be well-defined (depending on whether higher derivatives are required to
exist etc.). However, in those cases where the composition u = s ∗ e of states s ∈ S
and e ∈ E is well-defined, it is assumed to be unique.
Greaves and Wallace introduce subsystem and environment symmetries σ|S and
σ|E as restrictions of universe symmetries σ to the states spaces S and E . They
require that ‘for all s ∈ S, e ∈ E , σ(s ∗ e) = σ|S(s) ∗ σ|E(e) for some maps σ|S
5See (Strocchi 2015) for further reasons to accord special status to those symmetry
transformations that are generated by the first class constraints, namely, that they entail
a so-called local Gauss law, which imposes tight constraints on the empirical laws. In
classical electromagnetism the local Gauss law corresponds to the Maxwell equations.
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and σ|E [such that t]he symmetries ΣS of S and ΣE of E are just the sets of all
such σ|S and σ|E respectively.’ (Greaves and Wallace 2014, p. 68) They assume
that restrictions σ|S can be defined not only for internal symmetries σ but also for
space-time symmetries such as translations, boosts, and rotations. However, if s∗ e
is a well-defined universe state, the state σ|S(s) ∗ e—where only s but not e has
been subjected to the symmetry σ—need not be well-defined. In general, it is only
well-defined if σ|S is boundary-preserving on a class of states to which s belongs.
(Greaves and Wallace 2014, Sect. 5) Using this formal machinery, let us try to spell
out what it might mean for two subsystem ontic variables to designate the same
physical state in the spirit of the assumption DES.
By DES, symmetry-related subsystem states are physically different if the sym-
metry that connects them has direct empirical significance. For a symmetry to have
direct empirical significance, in turn, the subsystem states that it connects must be,
as Teh puts it, “empirically distinguishable with respect to a reference/environment
system” (Teh 2015, p. 99, emphasis mine). Prima facie, a “reference system” need
not be the same as an “environment system”, and it may make sense to consider
separately how one could empirically distinguish between subsystem states from
the point of view of the environment (viewed as the rest of the universe) and from
the point of view of another (finite and compact) proper subregion of the universe.
Let us first look at what it might mean for two subsystem states to be empiri-
cally distinguishable with respect to the environment. As an initial suggestion, one
might use the idea that two subsystem states s and s′ are physically identical if
an external observer, located in the subsystem’s environment, could not distinguish
between s and s′ by probing the subsystem using a measurement intervention. How-
ever, when taken literally, the idea leads to difficulties because probing a subsystem
will in general affect its state and, by breaking the subsystem’s isolation, may affect
for which environment states e ∈ E both s ∗ e and s′ ∗ e are defined. An alternative
implementation of what it might mean for two subsystem states to be empirically
distinguishable with respect to the environment that is both straightforward and
very general is the following: s and s′ are distinguishable from the point of view of
some external observers if and only if, when combined with some suitable state of
the environment E in which an external observer may reside, they yield physically
different universe states s ∗ e and s′ ∗ e. Conversely, this means that the ontic vari-
ables s and s′ designate one and the same subsystem physical state if and only if,
for arbitrary environment states e ∈ E , the resulting universe states s ∗ e and s′ ∗ e,
if they are defined, are physically identical:
Assumption (SUL)
For all s, s′ ∈ S:
s ∼ s′, iff s ∗ e ∼ s′ ∗ e for all e ∈ E for which s ∗ e and s′ ∗ e are defined,
(where “SUL” stands for “subsystem-universe link”).
We can illustrate the meaning of SUL by appeal to Galileo’s ship (making
the idealizing assumption that the ship is completely isolated with respect to the
shore), where it yields the desired result that boosts do indeed have direct empirical
significance: a situation s′ ∗ e in which the ship is moving (“boosted”) with respect
to the shore—which is part of the environment—is evidently physically different
from a situation s ∗ e where it is at rest with respect to the shore, even though s
and s′ = σ|S(s) (where σ|S is the boost as applied to the ship alone) are empirically
equivalent from inside the ship. SUL produces the result that the ship’s unboosted
6
and boosted states s and s′ are physically different, which, by DES, entails that
the boost σ|S has direct empirical significance, exactly as it should according to
the discussion in section 2.
Let us now look at what it might mean for two states s1 and s
′
1 of a subsystem
S1 to be empirically distinguishable from the point of view of a second, external,
reference subsystem S2, which is now no longer the “environment” in the sense of
the entire rest of the universe but a further compact and bounded proper subregion
of the universe in its own right. As an example, S1 could be Galileo’s ship and
S2 could be the shore, considered as a separate subsystem rather than as part of
the environment. Now consider the question whether if s1 and s
′
1 are physically
distinct states of Galileo’s ship, they could still give rise to one and the same state
of the joint subsystem “ship + shore” when combined with suitable “shore states”
s2 and s
′
2. In other words, could we “compensate” for a change in the state of the
ship from s1 to s
′
1 by adjusting the state of the shore from s2 to s
′
2 such that the
resulting physical state s′1 ∗ s′2 of the combined “ship + shore” system would be the
same as the original state s1 ∗ s2?
Arguably, on an intuitively plausible reading of “physical state”, the answer to
this question is “no”: to consider an example, assume that the ship states s1 and
s′1 are physically different in that the cabin colour differs between them. It would
seem absurd to contemplate “balancing” this difference by adjusting the shore state
between s2 and s
′
2 such that the combined states s1 ∗ s2 and s′1 ∗ s′2 are physically
identical. In other words, one cannot erase a physical difference such as that due
to different cabin colours by adjusting the physical states of external subsystems
such as the shore. Furthermore, even if s1 and s
′
1, though physically different, are
symmetry-related, e.g. an unboosted and a boosted state of the ship, it seems
plausible that we cannot compensate for the difference between them, not even by
“co-boosting” the shore from s2 to s
′
2: by DES and SUL, boosts of states of proper
subsystems of the universe connect physically distinct subsystem states, and since
the combined “ship + shore” subsystem is still a universe subsystem, the states
s1 ∗s2 and s′1 ∗s′2 will still count as physically distinct. There is no motivation then
to not consider s1 and s
′
1 as physically distinct as well.
The considerations just developed are summed up in the following assumption:
Assumption (MAH)
For all s1, s
′
1 ∈ S1 and s2, s′2 ∈ S2,
if s1 ∗ s2 ∗ e ∼ s′1 ∗ s′2 ∗ e for all e ∈ E for which s1 ∗ s2 ∗ e and s′1 ∗ s′2 ∗ e are defined,
then s1 ∼ s′1 and s2 ∼ s′2.
In (Friederich 2015), where this assumption was first introduced, it was char-
acterized as a “modest anti-holism”—hence “MAH”—since it rejects the appar-
ently holistic idea that one and the same physical state of affairs of a subsystem
S = S1 ∪ S2 (where “∪” should be thought of as the mereological sum) can be
“reduced” in various different ways, i.e. MAH rejects the “holistic” idea that the
state of the whole can be decomposed in more than one way into physically distinct
states of the parts. Another way to characterize MAH is as a weak mereological su-
pervenience thesis: the complete physical state of the combined universe subsystem
S = S1 ∪S2 uniquely determines the physical states of its parts, the subsystems S1
and S2 (and, recursively, the physical states of the sub-subsystems of S1 and S2).
Note that MAH does not say that the states of the subsystem S1 and S2 jointly
fix the state of the combined subsystem S, which would be a much less modest,
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indeed implausible, anti-holistic thesis. To appreciate the difference, assume for a
moment that a quantum state (density matrix) ρ were the true physical state of
the subsystem S = S1 ∪ S2. Then one possible candidate for the physical state
of the subsystem S1 would be the reduced density matrix ρred,1 that is obtained
from ρ by “tracing out” the degrees of freedom associated with the second sub-
system S2. MAH would hold under these assumptions because ρred,1 and ρred,2
are uniquely determined by the state ρ of the combined subsystem S = S1 ∪ S2
by the “tracing out” operation. However, famously, the reduced states ρred,1 and
ρred,2 of the subsystems S1 and S2 do not uniquely determine the quantum state ρ
of the combined system, so the less modest anti-holistic thesis according to which
the physical states of the subsystems S1 and S2 jointly fix the physical state of the
combined subsystem S fails in this case.
5 Local gauge symmetries have no direct empirical
significance
In this section, I will re-derive a result concerning the direct empirical significance of
so-called local gauge symmetries in gauge theories (Friederich 2015). Among these
theories are the important Yang-Mills gauge theories, which are the backbone of
contemporary elementary particle physics. (See the appendix for a brief review.)
Without appealing to the additional assumption “Ext” used in (Friederich 2015) I
show that, by DES, SUL, and MAH, the local gauge symmetries in these theories
do not have any direct empirical significance. The decisive feature of local gauge
symmetries that is needed to derive the result is that, when restricted to operating
on a proper subgregion of the universe, they can always be extended to a symme-
try operating on a more encompassing (“embracing”) proper subregion in such a
way that this extension reduces to the identity transformation on the boundary of
the embracing region. The assumption “Ext” used in (Friederich 2015) postulates
explicitly that the extended symmetry that operates on the embracing system be
interior—i.e. that it have no direct empirical significance—but it turns out that
this condition is itself derivable.
The announced result concerning the (lack of) direct empirical significance of
gauge symmetries in local gauge theories is the following:
Proposition Given DES, SUL, and MAH, all local gauge symmetries in gauge
theories (i.e. e.g. symmetries of the form (6) in Yang-Mills theories) do not have
any direct empirical significance.
The derivation of this result goes as follows:
Let S be a subsystem in the sense of the present formalism, i.e. a compact, finite
proper subregion S of the universe, and let σ|S be some arbitrary local symmetry
that is defined on the subsystem state space S. Since σ|S is a subsystem local gauge
symmetry we can assume that, on an embracing subsystem V ⊃ S, the universe
symmetry σ of which σ|S is a restriction can be restricted to a symmetry σ|V of
σ which asymptotically approaches the identity transformation on the boundary of
V , i.e. σ|V is boundary-preserving on V . (In the appendix this is demonstrated
in detail for the special case where the theory in question is a Yang-Mills gauge
theory.) As a consequence, for any well-defined universe state v ∗ e with v ∈ V and
e ∈ E (where E in this case is the state space associated with E, the mereological
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complement of V ), the universe state σ|V (v) ∗ e is defined and physically identical
with v ∗ e, i.e.
v ∗ e ∼ σ|V (v) ∗ e . (1)
Using the assumption SUL we obtain that v ∼ σ|V (v). By DES, we conclude that
σ|V has no direct empirical significance.
Now, to show that σ|S has no direct empirical significance either, consider the
subsystem S′ = V \ S (mereologically speaking, the part of V that is not in S),
and let S ′ be the state space associated with S′. Since σ|V has no direct empirical
significance, DES yields for arbitrary states s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S ′ for which s ∗ s′ is
defined:
σV (s ∗ s′) ∼ s ∗ s′ . (2)
Using SUL, this gives for all e ∈ E for which σV (s ∗ s′) ∗ e and s ∗ s′ ∗ e are defined:
σV (s ∗ s′) ∗ e ∼ s ∗ s′ ∗ e . (3)
Decomposing σ|V in terms of its restrictions σ|S (the symmetry we were originally
interested in) and σS′ on the state spaces S and S ′ we find that for all e ∈ E for
which σV (s ∗ s′) ∗ e and s ∗ s′ ∗ e are defined:
σ|S(s) ∗ σS′(s′) ∗ e ∼ s ∗ s′ ∗ e . (4)
Using MAH, it follows that
σ|S(s) ∼ s . (5)
Since s was chosen arbitrary, Eq. (5) holds for all s ∈ S. By DES, this establishes
the proposition, namely, that σ|S has no direct empirical significance.
Note that this result holds whether or not σ|S itself is boundary preserving on
S (it suffices that it be extendable to some σ|V that is boundary preserving on an
embracing V ). As highlighted in (Friederich 2015), this result shows that DES,
SUL and MAH attribute direct empirical significance to fewer symmetries than
the assumptions made by Greaves and Wallace (2014). Note, however, that the
result does not carry over to global space-time symmetries, such as boosts, when
restricted to subsystems. The later, as argued in the previous section, are identified
as having direct empirical significance.
6 Conclusion
As remarked in Section 2, there are other ways to individuate subsystem physical
states than through SUL and MAH. Furthermore, as remarked in Section 3, there
are other ways to make the notion of direct empirical significance for symmetries
precise than by appeal to DES, notably *by means of the constrained Hamiltonian
formalism as done in (Teh 2015). There is no reason why one would have to make
a definitive choice between these different approaches, i.e. there is no reason to
oppose a healthy pluralism about ways to individuate subsystem physical states and
about characterizations of what it means for symmetries to have direct empirical
significance.
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To conclude in this pluralistic spirit, the main upshot of the present considera-
tions is that (i) there are various viable accounts of physical identity for subsystem
states, (ii) according to one viable account, encoded in SUL and MAH, subsystem
physical states can be physically distinct even if they are empirically indistinguish-
able from the point of view of observers confined to the subsystem itself, and (iii)
if one combines this account with an approach to the direct empirical significance
of symmetries as encoded in DES, one obtains the result that the local gauge sym-
metries in gauge theories do not have any direct empirical significance.
Appendix: Yang-Mills theories
Yang-Mills theories are a generalization of classical relativistic electrodynamics,
formulated in terms of so-called gauge field matrices Aµ =
∑
aA
a
µTa, where the
fields Aaµ are analogous to the vector potential in electrodynamics and the Ta are
the so-called generators of the Lie algebra associated with the gauge group through
which the theory is defined. In a proper Yang-Mills theory, this group is the non-
commutative (“non-Abelian”) SU(N) group of all N × N unitary matrices with
determinant 1 (for some integer N). In the Standard Model of elementary particle
physics, the gauge groups SU(2) and SU(3) appear. One obtains electrodynamics
if one takes the gauge group to be the (commutative) U(1) group, whose only
generator is the identity.
The Lagrangian of Yang-Mills theory is invariant with respect to local gauge
symmetries, which are given by those transformation of the matrices Aµ that are
of the form
Aµ 7→ A′µ = UAµU† −
(
i~
g
)
(∂µU) U
† . (6)
Here g is the coupling constant that governs interactions in the theory (correspond-
ing to the electric charge e in electrodynamics). The space-time dependent unitary
matrix U can be written in terms of some Hermitian matrix Λ as
U = exp
(
− ig
~
Λ
)
. (7)
The entries of the matrix Λ are real-valued functions on space-time that parametrize
all gauge transformations.
I will now show that, in this setting, any arbitrary local gauge symmetry σ|S
that is defined on some subsystem state space S can be extended to a local gauge
symmetry σ|V on the state space V associated with an embracing subsystem V that
is boundary preserving on V :
Any subsystem local gauge symmetry σ|S is associated with some Hermitian
matrix ΛS whose entries are real-valued functions on S. These functions can be
smoothly extended beyond the boundary of S on some embracing (still finite and
compact) proper subregion V ⊃ S of the universe to define a new Hermitian matrix
ΛV whose entries are functions that tend smoothly towards zero in a neighbourhood
of the boundary of V . The newly obtained matrix ΛV , in turn, defines a symmetry
σ|V which acts on the elements of V, the state space associated with V . Since the
entries of ΛV are zero in a neighbourhood of the boundary of V , the symmetry
σ|V is boundary presering on V , and the transformation σ|V ∗ 1E is defined and a
universe symmetry. This, furthermore, entails that, for any well-defined universe
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state v ∗ e with v ∈ V and e ∈ E , the universe state σ|V (v) ∗ e is also defined and
physically identical with v ∗ e.
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